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Oil price increases, European gas supply interruptions 
and the global climate impacts of greenhouse gas 
emissions are increasing the importance of renewable 
sources of energy. Photovoltaic (PV) technologies 
have emerged as a central plank in the establishment 
of a low-carbon energy system. There are, however, 
striking differences in the geographies of production 
and use of PV systems. Between 2000 and 2010 
Germany was the most important market, while China 
emerged as the most important manufacturer.
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Abstract
The trajectories of the German and Chinese photovoltaic industries differ significantly yet are strongly interdependent. 
Germany has seen a rapid growth in market demand and a strong increase in production, especially in the less developed 
eastern half of the country. Chinese growth has been export driven. These contrasting trajectories reflect the roles of 
market creation, investment and credit and the drivers of innovation and competitiveness. Consequent differences in 
competiveness have generated major trade disputes.
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The aim of this article is to explore and explain 
these contrasting geographies of demand and supply 
and their implications for relationships between 
Germany, Europe and China. The analysis itself 
derives from several sources. The first is the construc-
tion of a series of statistical databases dealing with 
trade, production and markets in China, Germany and 
the rest of the world. The second is a series of inter-
views with companies, industry organizations, 
research institutes and government officials con-
ducted in Germany and China between the summer of 
2010 and end of 2011.
The article is divided into five sections. In the first 
section we present a series of stylized facts relating to 
the trajectories of the PV sectors in Germany and 
China and the nature of the relations of complemen-
tarity, competition and interdependence between 
Germany and China that the article seeks to explain. 
The second section develops a theoretical framework 
and includes an account of the structure of the PV 
value chain. In the third section we provide an explan-
atory account of the dynamics of the German PV sec-
tor and its interaction with China. The fourth section 
deals with the Chinese case. In the fifth section we 
examine further the asymmetric interaction of these 
two national industries and national development tra-
jectories. We consider their empirical and theoretical 
implications for an understanding of relations 
between, in particular, Germany and Europe and, in 
general, advanced economies and emerging econo-
mies such as China.
The emerging geographies of 
production and consumption in the 
photovoltaic sector
In 2000–2010 worldwide solar power output has 
increased more than 100 times to reach 27.2 GW. In 
the last 5 years output growth was most rapid in 
China and Taiwan Republic of China. In 2010 China 
and Taiwan accounted for nearly 48% and 13% of 
total output, respectively (Photon International, 
2011). As China and Taiwan rose in importance as 
manufacturing centres for PV components, Europe 
and Japan declined in relative importance to account 
for 13% and 8%, respectively. The USA accounted 
for less than 5%.
The geography of use is quite different from the 
geography of manufacture. In 2010 annual installa-
tions were less than output (27.2 GW), standing at 
around 16.6 GW compared with 7.3 GW in 2009. 
Cumulative installations reached 39.5 GW. Of these 
totals, Germany alone accounted for 45% and 43%, 
respectively (EPIA, 2011). German market expansion 
has given a very substantial stimulus to the develop-
ment of the industry and of the wider value chain in 
Germany. In a globalized world, however, it is has also 
created markets for competitors in China and East 
Asia. These competitors pose a serious challenge to 
Germany’s own domestic manufacturing sector and, 
indeed, to the manufacturing sector in other developed 
countries. In 2011 some of these advanced country 
rivals sought trade protection.
These simple facts permit the identification of a 
number of distinct trajectories in the development of 
the industry (Figure 1) of which those of Germany 
and China are the subject of this article. Germany 
has seen a rapid growth in market demand and a 
strong increase in production, especially in the less 
developed eastern half of the country. In Germany 
production was for the domestic market and for 
export: German exports1 expanded from $524 
million in 2000 to $8097 million in 2010. Chinese 
growth was export driven. Exports grew from $178 
million to $25,179 million. In 2010 Chinese PV 
exports to Germany, worth $7637 million, were 
almost equal to total German PV exports. Until the 
implementation of some recent massive domestic 
solar installations, only about 5% of Chinese 
production was for domestic consumption. China’s 
export success was, however, a source of trade 
friction with developed countries.
Theories of geographies of trade and 
development and the photovoltaic 
chain
Analysing these different trajectories and roles 
involves drawing on a set of concepts capable of 
explaining geographies of PV sector trade and 
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development. The recent geographical literature has 
largely concentrated on the development of clusters, 
agglomerations, innovation, value chains and insti-
tutional and evolutionary ideas (Coe et al., 2004; 
Martin, 2011; Smith et al., 2002; Storper, 1995). We 
shall draw on some of these concepts, but shall 
argue, however, for a greater concern with geo-
graphical interdependence and a re-engagement 
with a political economy of trade and development. 
Geographies of production and international 
trade are mainly explained by two sets of theories. 
Theories of comparative advantage attribute special-
ization and trade to national resource endowments. 
The new geographical economics seeks to explain 
the ways in which resource endowments and relative 
competitiveness are created rather than endowed 
(Dunford et al., 2012).
In this article we shall examine the creation and 
evolution of endowments and competitiveness, but in 
ways that seek to overcome two of the limitations of 
these models. The first is the lack of attention to insti-
tutional factors. We shall emphasize the importance 
of international, national and local social foundations 
of economic growth (Figure 2). The second is the lack 
of explicit attention paid to money and the demand-
side drivers of trade and industrial dynamics. In 
Keynesian models, money and credit are the starting 
point for economic development and drive economic 
activity: credit creates deposits, deposits permit 
expenditure, capital advanced creates income, and 
Figure 1. Photovoltaic demand and supply trajectories, 2000−2010.
Elaborated from Earth Policy Institute, 2010a, 2010b. European Photovoltaic Industry Association (2011); Photon International.
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income creates further expenditure, which together 
drive capital accumulation and growth (Dunford et 
al., 2011). In a sense, the argument is close to the idea 
of a circuit of capital. Each firm in Figure 2 has its 
own circuit (Figure 3), which starts with the advance 
of money as capital to purchase material and human 
resources. These expenditures create money income 
for producers and wage earners. The expenditure of 
these incomes is a source of effective demand. Once 
produced, goods and services are offered for sale in 
the market place: if successful, income is earned and 
costs are recovered. These revenues are re-advanced, 
restarting the circuit, the size and character of which 
can change over time as enterprises pursue innova-
tion, growth and competitiveness strategies to com-
pete successfully with their domestic and international 
rivals (Figure 2). In this type of model capital expen-
diture, credit and investment subsidies and the 
creation of markets are crucial drivers of industrial 
dynamics.
Figure 3. A firm’s circuit of money capital.
Figure 2. A conceptual framework: industrial dynamics in a global context.
Elaborated from Liu and Dunford (2012).
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Van De Ven and Garud (2000: 493) have argued 
that industrial development is underpinned by three 
functional subsystems: an instrumental subsystem 
(applied R&D, manufacturing and assembly, and 
marketing and distribution); a resource procurement 
subsystem (scientific or technological knowledge, 
financing and a pool of competent human resources); 
and an institutional subsystem (governance structures 
and industrial support).
Combining this argument with our conception of 
the role of money and credit as drivers of trade and 
economic development leads to a modification of 
their analytical framework to identify three drivers, 
of which the third combines the resource procure-
ment and instrumental subsystems. More specifi-
cally we shall argue that geographies of the 
emergence and comparative development of indus-
trial activities in general and of the PV sector in par-
ticular can be seen as a result of three principal sets 
of drivers: (1) market creation and growth as a result 
of investment decisions of users of electrical energy 
shaped by institutional configurations and policy 
regimes; (2) investment in production driven by 
investment finance and credit creation; and (3) the 
drivers of innovation, cost reduction, marketing and 
distribution in enterprise value chains.
To compare and explain the different trajectories 
of Germany and China several further theoretical 
considerations relating to the structure and evolution 
of the industry value chain are required. In the case 
of Germany the development of solar energy 
involved the establishment of a new industry and 
new products. New industries and products are 
examined in the product life cycle literature. 
According to Vernon’s (1966) simple model (which 
classifies the phases of a product cycle as new prod-
ucts, maturing products, and standardized products 
in accordance with the degree of standardization) the 
manufacture of products that reach a state of matu-
rity moves to cheaper locations. In the case of China, 
however, the development of the solar industry was 
driven by Chinese companies and not by the reloca-
tion of investment by companies involved in the new 
product phase. This case involves consideration, 
therefore, of theories relating to catch-up, latecomer 
development and developmental states.
The simple life cycle idea also requires some 
modification to reflect the specific characteristics of 
different industries (Pavitt, 1984) and of their value 
chains (Figure 4 and Table 1). In the case of the 
crystalline silicon (c-Si) chain,2 on which we shall 
concentrate, cell and module manufacture involve 
the manufacture of equipment (mainly in Germany, 
Japan and the USA). The next step involves the 
capital-intensive manufacture of polysilicon, ingots, 
wafers and cells and the labour-intensive manufacture 
of modules. A complete system also requires the 
manufacture of inverters. On completion, the system 
is installed. Once operational, some PV electricity is 
sold to utilities. Installation accounts for a significant 
share of value added. This value is appropriated in 
the areas where the products are sold. In the USA, in 
2009 the costs of a module, an inverter and installation 
were $3, $0.5 and $4 per watt, respectively, giving a 
total of $7.5 per watt (McGehee, 2009). The 
manufacture of cells and modules accounts only for 
three-sevenths of the overall value added per watt.
The c-Si cell PV sector is largely a scale-intensive 
sector. In 2010 the realization of scale economies in 
cell manufacture was considered to require an annual 
Table 1. Solar cell and module value chain
Poly silicon Ingots Wafers Cells Modules Inverters and 
rest of system
Minimum efficient scale Very high High Low  
Factor-intensity Capital intensive Labour intensive  
Added value 26% 29% 23% 22%  
Number of firms in 2010  
China At least 100 At least 300  
Germany More than 200  
KNREC (2009), ECJRC (2010), BSW (2010), Solar & Energy (2011).
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production capacity in the order of 300 MWp (mega-
watt-peak). As in Pavitt’s (1984) classification, users 
are sensitive to price rather than performance; pro-
cess innovation and cost reduction are very impor-
tant; not, sources of innovation are internal (R&D 
and learning by doing) and external (equipment pro-
ducers); not, and appropriability is through secrecy 
and patents. These specific characteristics play an 
important role in explaining geographies of produc-
tion and use.
The aim of the next two sections is to examine the 
roles of market creation, investment and credit and the 
drivers of value-chain innovation and competitiveness 
in shaping the development of the PV sector. These 
drivers will be examined in the light of the specific 
characteristics of the sector. Attention must also be 
paid, however, to a set of international relationships 
marked by the presence of an initial market leader 
(Germany), a country that embarked on catch-up and 
may overtake the initial leaders (China), a set of 
institutionally mediated trade disputes deriving from 
international competition and trade flows. These 
interdependencies and their implications for studies of 
German and European development will be considered 
in the conclusions.
The German case: market 
creation and the rise of German 
manufacturing
The German PV sector is a new industry, and 
therefore its development requires awareness of the 
historical steps in the emergence of the PV sector. 
These steps involved significant institutional 
choices. The PV effect was discovered in 1839. In 
1954 the first modern silicon solar cell was invented. 
German scientific and applied research institutions, 
including the Max Planck Society (MPS), founded 
in 1948, and the Fraunhofer Society, founded in 
1949, played a major role in PV scientific and 
technological development. After 1958 a commercial 
space satellite market emerged (Wolf, 1972). In the 
1960s, owing to US restrictions on exports to the 
European Space Agency, Telefunken (AEG-
Telefunken) and Siemens started to develop silicon 
solar cells (Jacobbson et al., 2004). In the 1970s the 
oil crisis stimulated many PV energy experiments, 
out of which the silicon-type of solar cell emerged as 
what Utterback (1994) would call a ‘dominant 
design’: Utterback had insisted that product life 
cycle theory pay attention to the emergence of 
specific products from among competing designs. In 
the 1980s, special off-grid PV markets gradually 
increased to provide electricity in remote areas. In 
Germany major change came, however, after the 
1986 Chernobyl disaster. Opposition to nuclear 
power soared, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
and the Green Party committed themselves to 
phasing out nuclear power (Lauber and Mez, 2004) 
and Förderverein Solarenergie (Solar Promotion 
Association) and Eurosolar were established to 
promote solar PV energy.
The outcome was three significant attempts to 
create solar PV markets in Germany (market creation 
factor). The first was the1989 1000-roof programme, 
which saw the installation of 2250 grid-connected 
Figure 4. The photovoltaic value chain.
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roof-mounted installations with a capacity of 5.3 
MWp by 1993 (Lauber and Mez, 2004) and the 
development of new inverters for feeding 
decentralized power into the network grid (Jacobbson 
et al., 2004). The second was the approval by all 
parliamentary political parties of the Electricity 
Feed-in Law of 1990. This law adopted the concept 
of a cost-covering payment for relatively expensive 
renewable energy as originally proposed by 
Förderverein Solarenergie and Eurosolar (Lauber and 
Mez, 2004). This law required electric utilities to 
connect renewable energy generators to the grid, and 
to buy the electricity at rates of 65–90% of the 
average tariff for final customers. If grid connection 
is completely unviable, the utilities must share the 
costs of the renewable installation. The grid 
connection requirement was an especially important 
driver of market expansion.3
The new law saw the wind energy market explode, 
but the price of nearly 17 pfennig (approximately 9 
euro cents) per kWh was too low to cover the costs 
of solar energy (Lauber and Mez, 2004). The growth 
of the PV sector derived rather from a third set of 
subnational initiatives, which saw the Aachen model 
spread to dozens of German cities. Under this model 
local governments imposed ‘cost-covering contracts’ 
with renewable generators on municipal utilities. In 
addition, some Land governments subsidized solar 
installations (Jacobbson et al., 2004; Lauber and 
Mez, 2004). Owing to these local-level initiatives, 
the German PV market continued to grow throughout 
the 1990s, even though the 1000-roof programme 
ended in 1993 (Lauber and Mez, 2004).
These initial demand side measures created a 
German market that encouraged the first generation 
of German PV firms to expand. Siemens and ASE 
(Applied Solar Energy: Angewandte Solarenergie) 
acquired US PV firms that had state-of-the-art PV 
technology (Jacobbson et al., 2004). In 1998 ASE 
started a new factory with an annual production 
capacity of 20 MW (Lauber and Mez, 2004), and 
Royal Dutch Shell entered into the German solar cell 
industry with a 9.5 MW plant (Lauber and Mez, 
2004). Capacity, however, exceeded the size of the 
domestic market: after 2000 these plants were taken 
over by RWE Schott Solar and Solar World, which 
were members of a new generation of PV firms.
The feed-in law faced strong opposition from 
electricity utilities with investments in coal and 
nuclear technologies. In the face of opposition a 
Eurosolar proposal for a 100,000-roof programme in 
1993 was not supported by the ruling Conservative–
Liberal government (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). 
Attempts to go further and reduce feed-in rates were, 
however, narrowly blocked (Jacobsson and Lauber, 
2006). In 1998 the election of a Red–Green (SDP–
Green) coalition saw a major change of course that 
marked out Germany from other countries. In January 
1999 the new government started the 100,000-roof 
programme. Second, and more importantly, in March 
2000 it adopted the Renewable Energy Source Law 
(Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz: EEG).4 In 2002 the 
Nuclear Energy Phase-Out Act was adopted and 
increased the importance of alternative renewable 
energy policies (Lauber and Mez, 2004).
The new renewable energy law increased the 
feed-in rate from 17 to 99 pfennig (approximately 
50 euro cents), covering the cost of PV electricity. 
In addition, the new rate was guaranteed for 20 
years to enable recovery of the capital outlay over 
the lifetime of a capital-intensive PV system (BSW, 
2011; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Lauber and 
Mez, 2004). In Germany an annual degression of 
5% was applied: the aim was to create a mass market 
and to create a situation where the scaling up of 
production would drive down costs to users. In 2004 
the tariff was amended downwards and, since the 
end of 2007, it has been subject to nearly constant 
renegotiation, as the industry developed faster, and 
costs declined faster, than expected. A July 2010 
adaptation saw a large cut in remuneration structure, 
with further change at the start of 2011. Overall, the 
feed-in rate for PV electricity decreased from 50.6 
euro cents per kWh in 2000 to around 25 euro cents 
per kWh in 2011.
The ultimate aim, of course, is grid parity: a 
situation in which solar energy is at least as cheap as 
grid power. For solar energy it depends on several 
factors: the greater the abundance of sunlight, the 
higher the costs of grid electricity and the lower the 
costs of solar energy, the quicker grid parity will be 
achieved (Figure 5). Germany has relatively high 
electricity costs, but sunshine is not especially 
abundant.
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The new law saw the German market explode: it 
grew from 42 MW in 2000 to 7408 MW in 2010. 
Demand also increased in other countries, especially 
Spain, which also adopted a feed-in tariff. At the 
same time, a number of new companies entered the 
market through either mergers and takeovers or new 
investment (Figure 6).The Schott group, one of the 
largest glass manufacturers, entered the PV industry 
in 2002. Siemens Solar was taken over by Shell 
Solar in 2002, which was later acquired by Solar 
World in 2006. The Bosch group entered the PV 
sector through the acquisition of Ersol Solar in 2008.
The development of manufacture was closely 
associated with the development of the German 
equipment industry. Of the top 10 equipment 
suppliers in the world, six are German (Table 2). As 
Figure 5. Grid parity and its drivers.
McGehee (2010).
Figure 6. Growth of the German photovoltaic sector.
Lee (2011).
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the industry expanded, their sales increased rapidly 
from €0.2 billion in 2005 to €2 billion in 2009 (BSW, 
2010) with the export proportion rising from 31% to 
79%. As most production processes of PV cells are 
automated, equipment suppliers play a significant 
role in improving productivity.
Value chain dynamics and the rise of 
German manufacturing
As costs depend largely upon scale, German 
companies have made major efforts to expand 
capacity with Q-Cells reaching 800 MW and Solar 
World nearly 500 MW by 2009 (Table 3). Scale-
driven cost reductions have been accompanied by 
cost reduction through improved technologies. First, 
over 4–5 years from 2003 Q-Cells and Solar World 
reduced wafer thickness from 330 μm to 180 μm, 
reducing the consumption of polysilicon material by 
about 45%. The adoption of string ribbon technology 
also affords reductions, in this case of 30% to 35% 
by cutting waste. Second, cell efficiency has been 
increased from 14% in 2002 to 18% by 2008 or 
2009.
These developments and the consequent cost 
reductions in Germany were also a result of external 
pressures deriving from reductions in feed-in rates 
and Chinese and Asian competition, which we shall 
shortly consider. In the 5 years from April 2006 end-
customer prices declined by nearly one-half, from 
€5000 to €2546 per kWp (Figure 7).The German 
Solar Industry Association’s (BSW’s) ‘PV-Roadmap 
2020’ anticipates a further drop in the price of PV 
systems to €1500 per kWp by 2017 (Roland Berger 
Table 3. Annual production capacity (MW)
Value chain 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Q-Cells Cells 22  63 170 292 420  645  860 800 1100  950
Solar World Poly-silicon 
(tonnes)
  2 810 1200 2250  
 Wafers 32 55 120 180 245  385  600 900 1000 1000
 Cells 30  60 185  205  260 450  775  800
 Modules 10  50  54  90 140  185  310 500  940  850
Q-Cells, annual reports; Solar World, annual reports.
Table 2. Top 10 companies of the solar cell equipment industry
Rank Company Home country Sales in 2008 (US$, million)
 1 Applied Materials US 455
 2 Roth & Rau AG Germany 275
 3 Centrotherm GmbH Germany 270
 4 Oerlikon Balzers AG Switzerland 250
 5 Ulvac Inc. Japan 240
 6 Manz Automation AG Germany 140
 7 Schmid GmbH Germany 125
 8 Von Ardenne GmbH Germany 120
 9 Rena Sondermaschinen GmbH Germany  85
10 Swiss Solar Systems Switzerland  70
VLSI Research (2008).
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Strategy Consultants and Prognos AG, 2010). If 
prices fall this far, house-roof PV system installations 
will be affordable for house owners without any 
government support.5
The improvements in technology that permit 
these cost and price reductions derive not just from 
scale changes and internal R&D (which accounts for 
10.4% of personnel in Sunways, 7.8% in Q-Cells, 
6% in Schott and 4.5% in Solar World),6 but also 
from public and private co-operation. German com-
panies have had important co-operation programmes 
with research institutes and universities (Konstanz 
and Freiberg), applied research institutes (CSP 
Fraunhofer Center for Silicon PV and the ISE 
Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems), 
technical service agencies, other companies and 
equipment suppliers. These projects may involve 
participation in government programmes, contracts 
with applied research institutes and technical agen-
cies, joint ventures or participation in the capital of 
other companies, as, for example, when Q-Cells and 
US Evergreen Solar established a joint venture, 
EverQ GmbH (presently Sovello), to develop and 
commercialize string ribbon technology. Most of the 
projects with universities and research institutes 
were designed to improve c-Si PV technology. The 
development of new thin-film technologies relied 
more on co-operation with other companies.
To maintain competitiveness, German companies 
have formed various strategic partnerships and 
relocated parts of their production lines overseas. 
For instance, Q-Cells concentrated on the rapid 
expansion of solar cell production capacity. At the 
same time it has tried to establish stable customer–
supplier relationships via strategic partnerships. 
For example, it acquired 17% of the capital of 
Norwegian REC (Renewable Energy Corporation), 
the world’s foremost manufacturer of polysilicon 
and silicon wafers. These steps also contribute 
to its strategy of vertical near-integration. Cost 
considerations also led, however, to movement 
offshore to lower cost locations: in 2008 Q-Cells 
established a production facility in Malaysia, while 
Schott Solar operates a factory at Valašskè Meziříčí 
in the Czech Republic.
Solar World adopted a different strategy: it chose to 
integrate vertically, dealing in-house with all manufac-
turing steps from silicon to module manufacture. To 
circumvent trade barriers and take advantage of local 
subsidies, Solar World established a plant in Hillsboro, 
Oregon, and Schott Solar followed suit with a plant in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, in the USA.
In Germany production growth remained healthy. 
In 2010, however, few producers significantly 
expanded the capacity of their European facilities. 
Instead they chose to either utilize existing capacity 
or rely on contract manufacturing or offshore 
production to serve market demand. These trends 
were a portent of the increased competitive pressures 
that in 2011 would be translated into increased 
tensions over international trade and East Asian 
competition (see section ‘Conclusions’).
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Figure 7. Average end-customer prices for installed roof-mounted systems of up to 100 kWp per kWp.
BSW (2011).
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The German case: finance and 
investment
Credit and investment capital play a fundamental 
role in driving industrial development (see ‘Theories 
of geographies of trade and development and the 
photovoltaic chain’ section). The creation of a 
market in Germany stimulated investment decisions 
that required a mobilization of financial resources to 
invest in production capacity and distribution 
channels. Some of these resources were raised on 
German financial markets, from bank loans and 
from the German stock and corporate bond markets. 
For instance, in 2005 Ersol and Q-Cells raised some 
€153 million and €240 million, respectively, through 
initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange. A significant share of resources came, 
however, from grants and subsidies available from 
the European Union’s Structural and Cohesion 
Policies and the German government’s development 
funds targeted at the economically less developed 
eastern part of Germany. After the unification of 
Germany, the new Länder were designated as 
Objective 1 or Convergence regions. In 1994–1999 
East Germany received ECU 13.6 billion (Wishlade, 
1996: 49). Additional resources arrived in 2000–
2006 and for the period 2007–2013. These funds 
helped finance generous regional government 
investment incentives in East Germany.
To stimulate investments in solar energy, three East 
German Länder (Thüringen, Sachsen and Sachsen-
Anhalt), with the support of the Federal Ministry for 
Education and Research (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung and Forschung), established Solar Valley 
Central Germany (Solarvalley Mitteldeustchland). In 
2008 this area accounted for 43% of German PV turn-
over and 75% of German production of solar cells, 
afforded 10,000 direct PV jobs and housed four of the 
top 10 companies in the world. Association members 
include 29 global PV companies, nine renowned 
research organizations and four universities (Liebe, 
2010; Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland, 2010). To sup-
port the PV sector, the association offers investment 
grants, R&D subsidies and assistance with operating 
costs. Investment grants can cover up to 30% or 50% 
of eligible investment costs, and Länder R&D subsi-
dies cover 50–80% of expenses. The Länder also cover 
80–100% of employee training and qualification costs 
(LEG, 2009).
In a 5-year period a total budget of €150 
million was allocated to 98 joint projects. One-half 
of these were financed by the public sector 
(Solarvalley Mitteldeutschland, 2010). Q-Cells, 
Sunways, SolarWorld and Schott Solar participated 
in these projects. With regard to investment grants, 
these subsidies were more helpful for start-ups and 
expansions. Interview data indicate that public 
subsidies from the European Union and the state 
government accounted for 35% of the initial 
financing of Deutsche Solar AG (a current Solar 
World AG company) in 1994 (Woditsch, 2011).7 
Sachsen-Anhalt’s state subsidy influenced strongly 
the decision of Q-Cells to locate in Thalheim, when 
it was looking for a site to construct a large solar cell 
factory in 2000 (Seifert, 2011). Annual report data 
indicate that Solar World was provided with €73 
million for the expansion of solar factories in 
Freiberg in Saxony in 2003, and Q-Cells received a 
grant of approximately €21 million for the 
construction of factories in Thalheim in 2004.
Table 4. Main photovoltaic companies in Solar Valley Mitteldeutschland
State Wafers Cells Modules
Thuringia Bosch Solar in Arnstadt Bosch Solar in Erfurt Bosch Solar in Erfurt
 Schott Solar in Jena Sunways in Arnstadt Schott Solar in Jena
 PV Crystalox in Erfurt  
Sachsen SolarWorld in Freiberg SolarWorld in Freiberg SolarWatt in Dresden
 SolarWorld in Freiberg
Sachsen-Anhalt PV Crystalox in Bitterfeld Q-Cells in Thalheim  
 Sovello in Thalheim  
Source: Lee, 2011
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The Chinese case: market creation
The Chinese case differs from the German case in a 
number of respects. Although the general drivers are 
similar, their form differs in that Chinese growth is 
export orientated, relies on catch-up rather than 
initial mover advantages and enjoys access to cheap 
capital as well as, in common with Germany, strong 
government financial support.
In China solar cell research dates from at least 
1958. The first application and the first market had, 
however, to await China’s second space satellite 
project in 1971 (Cui et al., 1990; Zhao, 2001). 
Terrestrial applications followed. In the 1990s the 
Chinese government and a number of international 
organizations implemented a series of programmes 
to provide electricity to 80 million people who lived 
in rural areas in western China and who, in 1995, had 
no access to grid electricity (CRED, 2000; Stone et 
al., 1998). At a national level the National Eight-
Seven Poverty Alleviation Programme, the China 
Brightness Programme and the Project to Raise 
Income Levels of the Poor by Introducing Electricity 
resulted in the distribution of household PV systems 
to meet the needs of peasants and herdsmen in five 
provinces of southwest China, Inner Mongolia and 
Tibet. A number of PV systems (including wind–PV, 
wind–diesel, and wind–diesel–PV hybrid systems 
and small independent PV and solar PV generation 
systems) were installed in regions rich in solar 
energy potential, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, 
Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia. For 
instance, six county-level PV stations with a capacity 
of 250 kW were installed in Tibet at the end of 1998 
(CRED, 2000: 63–64). Internationally, the Chinese 
government collaborated with a number of 
organizations to deploy PV systems in China. 
Examples include the US Department of Energy 
(DOE) project, the Netherlands’ Shell project, the 
Eldorado Program (a Sino-German project), the 
World Bank and Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
project, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) project and the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
project (CRED, 2000).
A particularly important policy initiative was the 
‘Transmission of Electricity to Village (Song Dian 
Dao Xiang)’ programme carried out in the early 
2000s. These government programmes increased 
domestic demand for PV systems and created a 
market for newly established PV firms, such as Trina 
Solar and Yingli, enabling them to accumulate 
experience on domestic markets (Wei, 2010).8 Aided 
by a host of preferential policies and incentives, 
installed PV system capacity in China increased, 
with annual growth rates around 27% in 1993–1998. 
Annual installed PV capacity was, however, still 
low: 2.3 MWp in 1997 and 3.0 MWp in 1998, up 
from 900 in 1993 (Dai and Shi, 1999). In 1997 
installed production capacity stood at about 4.5 
MWp (CRED, 2000).
Another extremely important initiative starting in 
the 1990s was the widespread use of solar water 
heating technologies. China’s annual solar water 
heater production capacity stood at 500,000 m2 in 
1992, 15 million m2 in 2005 and 49 million m2 in 
2010. In 2005 the total surface area reached 8000 m2 
(58% of the global total). In 2010 it reached 168 mil-
lion m2 (60% of the world total, and 123.5 m2 per 
1000 people). In the National Development and 
Reform Commission’s 2007 long-term renewable 
energy development plan (可再生能源中长期发展
规划: Kezaisheng nengyuan zhong changqi fazhan 
guihua – Medium and long-term renewable energy 
development plan) the use of solar energy for heat-
ing was identified as a major priority. For solar water 
heating, targets for 2010 and 2020 were set at 150 
million m2 and approximately 300 million m2, 
respectively. Combined with other thermal applica-
tions of solar energy these alternative energy sources 
would provide 30 and 60 million tonnes of coal 
equivalent.
Government support for R&D increased signifi-
cantly over the course of time. To address energy 
issues the Chinese government provided PV R&D 
funds in the Sixth (1981–1985) and Seventh (1986–
1990) Five-year Plans (FYPs) (Cui et al., 1990). In 
the Eighth (1991–1995) and Ninth (1996–2000) 
FYPs, funds for increasing the efficiency and reduc-
ing the cost of renewable energy reached 60 and 82 
million RMB (approximately US$9.2 and 12.6 mil-
lion), respectively (CRED, 2000). In 1995, the State 
Planning Commission (SPC), the State Science and 
Technology Commission and the State Economic 
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and Trade Commission jointly formulated the 
Development Programme for China New and 
Renewable Energy for the 1996–2010 period 
(CRED, 2000) that saw the installation of mass pro-
duction lines for poly c-Si solar cells, the upgrading 
of production lines for mono c-Si solar cells and 
R&D into new types of high-efficiency and low-cost 
solar cells (CRED, 2000).
In China a Renewable Energy Law passed in 
2005 came into effect in 2006. All electricity users 
are charged a renewable energy fee, and grid 
operators are reimbursed for the extra cost of 
renewable energy. In addition, grid operators are 
penalized financially if they fail to connect renewable 
energy sources to the grid notwithstanding the fact 
that renewable sources are often in remote places 
and incur substantial transmission losses (Bradsher, 
2010). In the case of solar energy a limited feed-in 
tariff was introduced in Jiangsu Province (Wei, 
2010).9 In 2009 the adverse effects of the 2008 
global financial crisis on PV companies and 
renewable energy targets saw the central government 
(the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and the National Energy Administration 
of the National Development and Reform 
Commission) launch the ‘Golden Sun (Jin Taiyang)’ 
project to facilitate the deployment of large-scale PV 
plants of no less than 500 MWp within 2–3 years 
(MOST, 2009). In 2011 China announced the 
provisions for a feed-in tariff (CREDP, 2008; EPIA, 
2010). Although the rates are lower than in Europe 
(up to 1.15 yuan/RMB per kWh for approved solar 
projects in 2011, compared with 50.6 euro cents per 
kWh in 2000 and 25 in 2011 in Germany), Chinese 
land and installation costs in areas with large 
amounts of sunlight are low.
The significance of the Chinese market for the 
solar industry is obviously growing. To date, how-
ever, government demand-pull policies were not 
enough to absorb the output of the Chinese PV 
industry. As a result, the surplus output of the 
Chinese solar industry was largely exported to 
European markets: in 2009 China produced around 
3782 MWp of PV modules, but installed only 228 
MWp domestically (Figure 1). By entering global 
markets Chinese firms were able to secure the vol-
umes required to achieve economies of scale.
The Chinese case: technology and 
costs
To establish an industry and subsequently enter 
global markets Chinese companies had to overcome 
‘two sets of competitive disadvantages’ faced by 
latecomer firms (Hobday, 1995). The first is a 
technology gap, deriving from isolation from the 
main international sources of technology. The other 
is a marketing disadvantage because the latecomer 
firm is dislocated from mainstream international 
markets. However, latecomer firms may have 
substantial cost advantages over leading firms. As 
Hobday (1995) argued, there are various routes to 
overcoming these disadvantages: joint ventures; 
licensing; original equipment manufacture (OEM); 
own-design and manufacture (ODM); subcontracting; 
foreign and local buyers; informal means (overseas 
training, hiring and recruiting returnees); overseas 
acquisition/equity investments; and strategic 
technology partnerships.
In the 1970s solar cells were produced in three 
small Chinese state-owned former semiconductor 
plants: Kaifeng Solar Cell Factory in Henan (which 
was established in 1964 and started to produce mono 
c-Si solar cells from 1975); Ningbo Solar Power 
Source Factory (now called Sun Earth Solar Power, 
which was founded as a semiconductor plant in 1966 
and made cells and modules from 1978); and Yunnan 
Semiconductor Devices Factory in Kunming (which 
was established in 1977 and started to produce mono 
c-Si solar cells in 1979) (CRED, 2000). Costs were 
high (400 RMB or US$206) per watt-peak in 1976 
(Cui et al., 1990) and output was low, reaching 
merely 0.5 kW, 1 kW and 2 kW in 1976, 1977 and 
1978, respectively (Cui et al., 1990).
In the 1970s Chinese companies lagged well 
behind their western counterparts. In the 1980s 
their relative position improved as a result of the 
one-off imports of solar cell equipment from the 
USA and the UK with help from the State Science 
and Technology Commission (CRED, 2000; Dai and 
Shi, 1999). In 1989, the Huamei PV Equipment 
Company of Qinhuangdao (Hebei) entered the solar 
cell sector (CRED, 2000; Dai and Shi, 1999). R&D 
cooperation between manufacturers and research 
institutes increased, and more than 200 engineers 
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and technicians were employed in the four 
companies. In 1989 China’s annual production of 
PV cells reached 400 KWp (Cui et al., 1990).
The gap between the four mono c-Si solar cell 
manufacturers and their counterparts in developed 
countries nonetheless remained large. In the late 
1980s costs remained high at around 40 RMB or 
US$11 per watt-peak. Chinese PV modules were 
therefore some 10% more expensive than foreign 
products, despite lower costs of plant construction 
and labour (CRED, 2000; Dai and Shi, 1999). The 
investments in new equipment were one-off 
investments (CRED, 2000). Capacity was not 
sufficient to take advantage of economies of scale, 
while capacity utilization rates were around 50% 
(CRED, 2000; Cui et al., 1990; Dai and Shi, 1999). 
Average photoelectric efficiency of Chinese 
commercialized silicon solar cells was 10–12%, 
compared with 14–16% in developed countries 
(CRED, 2000; Dai and Shi, 1999). The quality of 
Chinese solar modules fell short of competitors on 
the domestic and international markets. Wafer 
thickness was about 400 μm compared with 250 μm 
in foreign firms because of differences in cutting 
technologies that raised silicon feedstock usage and 
production costs (Dai and Shi, 1999). In the case of 
amorphous silicon modules, Chinese manufacturers 
produced only single-junction modules, whereas 
most foreign firms produced double- or triple-
junction modules (CRED, 2000).
Although R&D activities increased, most PV 
R&D projects were small in scale, as government 
funding was limited, and spread across a large 
number of applicants, while the R&D projects 
themselves seldom resulted in successful 
commercialization (Dai and Shi, 1999). Moreover, 
most users were people in remote and poor areas 
who cared little about the technical performance or 
the efficiency of the systems, so the companies 
received little feedback or pressure to improve 
performance from the domestic market (Dai and Shi, 
1999). As a result, solar cell firms had difficulty in 
making ends meet, and Chinese banks were reluctant 
to lend, owing to poor credit ratings and uncertainty 
about the solar cell market (CRED, 2000; Dai and 
Shi, 1999).The limited availability of external 
finance in turn meant that China’s traditional PV 
firms could not afford to invest in R&D and process 
innovation in this period (CRED, 2000).
In the 1990s China’s Open Door Policy helped 
increase foreign investment. This investment 
included the establishment of several PV sector joint 
ventures: Harbin-Chronar Solar Power Company in 
1991 and Shenzhen Yukang Solar Energy Ltd in 
1992, although the latter was closed in 1997 (CRED, 
2000; Dai and Shi, 1999). In the mid-1990s the 
annual domestic PV market reached over 2 MWp. 
Also in the 1990s, some firms, including the Yunnan 
factory and Harbin-Chronar Solar Power Company, 
started to export solar cells and modules (CRED, 
2000). Towards the end of the decade a wave of 
foreign solar cell companies (British Petroleum, 
Shell, Siemens Solar, Sharp, Sanyo and SEC) arrived 
expecting a large volume of sales, partly because of 
the above-mentioned northern and western province 
electrification programmes (Dai and Shi, 1999).
In 1997 Trina Solar Energy was founded (Table 5). 
This step was the first of a series that resulted in the 
emergence of a new generation of PV firms in China. 
Today there are over 100 solar PV companies. Six of 
these new companies grew dramatically, with annual 
production capacity quickly reaching over 300 MWp, 
as did the state-owned Ningbo plant (Sun Earth), 
which was at least initially more directed at the 
national market (ECJRC, 2009).
Growth was so fast that these companies quickly 
joined the top producers in the world (Table 6). 
Moreover, as there is a definite trend towards vertical 
integration in the industry, the top cell producers are 
also top module producers.
The remarkable success of these companies 
involved several steps. First, they had to overcome 
the barriers faced by latecomers. Second, they had to 
exploit the cost advantages of manufacture in China.
To enter European markets, these companies had 
to establish marketing channels, acquire European 
certification such as TÜV and IEC certificates, 
provide the required 25-year guarantees and establish 
a reputation for credible and cheap products. 
Successful completion of these steps enabled them 
to overcome barriers to enter European markets 
(Chen, 2010).10
To overcome the technological gap, Chinese com-
panies imported turn-key equipment and expanded 
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their know-how via learning by doing. By the early 
2000s, c-Si solar cell technology had matured, so 
most state-of-the-art technologies were embodied in 
production equipment.11 At first, turn-key-based 
equipment was imported from Germany, the USA 
and Japan. As production took place, a rapid process 
of learning by manufacturing was set in motion (Lee, 
2010).12 Manufacturing experience enabled these 
companies to select the best equipment for each pro-
duction process and install it themselves. As the vol-
ume of domestic demand for PV equipment grew, 
local equipment suppliers emerged. The PV produc-
ers collaborated with these local equipment 
suppliers. Domestic equipment suppliers provided 
lower-priced capital goods, and by 2009 or so secured 
a 50% share of the Chinese PV equipment market 
(Chen, 2010; Lee, 2010; Xu, 2010; Yang, 2010; Zhu, 
2010).13 These developments were supported by a 
rich variety of complementary assets (Teece, 1986) 
available in China: machine tools, semiconductor 
and electronics industries, and a large supply of peo-
ple with knowledge of PV technologies implemented 
in the first generation of PV firms (Chen, 2010).
Two other channels played a role in the acquisi-
tion of technological capabilities. One was OEM 
manufacturing (Chen, 2010; Lee, 2010). The other 
Table 5. Production capacity of top photovoltaic companies in China (MWp)
Capacity Production Rank by capacity
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2010
JA Solar  75  175  600  875 2100 1463  1
Suntech Power 10 30  60 150 270  540 1000 1100 1800 1585  2
Trina Solar Energy   6   6  28  150  350  600 1200 1050  3
Yingli green energy 30  50 100 100  200  400  600 1000  980  4
Solarfun/Hanwha Solar One  240  360  420  500  500 10
China Sunergy  32 192  192  320  320  400  400 13
Sun Earth 100  200  450  
Total 10 60 116 288 665 1457 3030 3915 7000 5978  
Annual reports, company websites, interviews and Photon International (2011).
Table 6. Top 10 solar cell and solar module manufacturers in 2010
Rank Name Home 
country
Annual solar cells 
production (MWp)
Home 
country
Annual solar modules 
production (MWp)
 1 Suntech Power China 1584 Suntech Power China 1558
 2 JA Solar China 1464 First Solar US 1400
 3 First Solar US 1400 Yingli Green 
Energy
China 1061
 4 Yingli Green Energy China 1117 Trina Solar China 1060
 5 Trina Solar China 1116 Sharp Japan 1022
 6 Q-Cells Germany  939 Canadian Solar Canada  804
 7 Jintech Taiwan  800 Hanwha-
SolarOne
China  798
 8 Gintech Japan  745 Kyocera Japan  650
 9 Motech  715 REC Norway  491
10 Kyocera Japan  650 Sanyo Japan  405
Photon International (2011).
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was merger and acquisition activity. Suntech, for 
example, acquired for list that follows MSK 
Corporation, a leading PV module manufacturer; 
Building-Integrated PV (BIPV) company in Japan in 
2006; and KSL-Kuttler, a German company special-
izing in equipment automation in the printed circuit 
board industry in 2008.
A particularly distinctive feature of this Chinese 
process of technological learning was that it was led 
mainly by scientists who studied state-of-the-art PV 
technology in foreign countries (especially in 2002 
Nobel Laureate Professor Martin A. Green’s centre 
in the University of New South Wales in Australia). 
These scientists worked in conjunction with 
technicians (occupying high positions in the new 
companies) who had manufacturing experience in 
traditional Chinese PV firms (Chen, 2010; Zhu, 
2010). A complementary relationship between these 
two groups played an important role in innovation. 
The scientists had a good knowledge of state-of-the-
art technology and laboratory experiments, but 
sometimes lacked experience in manufacturing. In 
contrast, technicians who had worked in factories for 
a long time had deep tacit knowledge of mass 
production, but knew little about new technologies.
Almost all of the Chinese PV firms included in the 
survey except JA Solar adopted vertical integration 
strategies. As knowledge accumulated, vertical 
integration was seen as a way of securing raw 
materials and components and reducing transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1971). Yingli, Trina Solar and 
Solarfun started as module assemblers, as assembly 
was less complex technologically and subsequently 
integrated backwards. All undertook each stage of 
production from ingot and wafer to cell production. 
Yingli in 2009 added the polysilicon stage. Suntech 
and China Sunergy were founded by scientists with 
expert knowledge of state-of-the-art solar cell 
technologies. To reduce transaction costs, and expand 
earnings, the firms’ boundaries were extended to 
embrace module production.
As these obstacles facing latecomers were 
overcome, China could exploit its cost advantage: 
Chinese manufacturers were able to sell their 
products at prices around two-thirds of those of 
foreign companies. China’s competitiveness rested 
on several factors. First, labour costs are low, 
especially considering the quality of labour. The 
average salary of workers in the industrial sector was 
26,599 RMB (approximately US$3900) per year in 
2009 (NBSC, 2010). In Jiangsu, in 2009 the monthly 
salary of PV factory workers was between 1000 and 
1500 RMB (approximately $146 and $220) (Lee, 
2010).
Second, as wages were low, some production pro-
cesses, such as welding and arraying of solar cells in 
the module production process, are still carried out 
manually by workers. The manual process has two 
advantages. One is cost-effectiveness: in part, there 
are fewer breakages than in automated process (Zhu, 
2010).14 To reduce the number of breakages Chinese 
firms train workers carefully, but also employ pen-
alty systems that connect breakages to salaries 
(Chen, 2010; Lee, 2010; Xu, 2010; Zhu, 2010). The 
second advantage is customization. A customization 
strategy is important in the PV sector because there 
is demand for different sizes of PV modules, and this 
type of production is much cheaper if a manual pro-
cess is used (see also Zeng and Williamson, 2007).
A third cost advantage is low costs of people with 
engineering and technical skills, reducing in-house 
R&D, production and quality control costs. 
Traditional PV firms are one source of skilled 
workers with low wages. For example, a senior 
engineer working for Suntech originally worked at 
the Yunnan factory on a monthly salary of around 
2000 RMB (approximately US$300) in the 1990s 
(Chen, 2010). Chinese tertiary education is the 
second source. In 2002 more than 300,000 scientists 
and technologists graduated from Chinese 
universities. These degrees accounted for 73% of all 
first university degrees awarded in China (National 
Science Board, 2002, cited in Marigo, 2009). The 
average initial monthly salary of engineers with a 
Master’s degree in the PV industry is around 3000 
RMB (approximately US$430).
Fourth, as in Germany, collaborations between 
PV firms, local universities and domestic research 
institutes such as Shanghai Jiaotong University, Sun 
Yat-sen University and the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences increased, facilitating low-cost innovation 
(Xu, 2010; Zhu, 2010).
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China: finance and investment
Cheap finance and the provision of land and 
infrastructure at low costs were other major drivers of 
the competitive success of the Chinese solar industry. 
Wang (2010)15 estimates that the cost of setting up 
a 25-MWp production line with mixed local and 
foreign equipment was around one-half that of 
foreign companies (Wang, 2010). One reason for this 
difference is that local government could provide land 
at preferential rates. Another was the availability of 
government subsidies and abundant and cheap finance.
To finance rapid expansion and rapid realization 
of scale economies in largely capital-intensive 
sectors, two strategies were pursued. In the initial 
investment stage up to 2004 domestic demand was 
limited, the world market was small and growth was 
slow, making it difficult to raise finance. Chinese 
products were also of insufficient quality to compete 
on the markets that did exist. New Chinese 
companies, nonetheless, grew owing to local and 
especially city (shi) government assistance and 
guarantees in securing bank loans, and funding from 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Chen, 2010; and 
Park, 2009).16 In the case of Suntech:
In 2002 Suntech built a 10 MWp production capacity. 
In 2003 Dr Zengrong Shi, the CEO, tried to expand it 
to 30 MWp. Most senior executive officers and major 
stockholders objected because PV markets were uncer-
tain and the firm was far from profitable. Sometimes 
salaries for senior executives and engineers were not 
paid by the firm. Some engineers therefore left the 
firm. But, he convinced Wuxi City government and 
local state-owned companies [SOEs] to invest in his 
firm, enabling Suntech to expand capacity to 30 MWp 
production in 2003).16
Assistance from local government and local 
government loan guarantees also enabled companies 
to secure bank loans and SOE investments. Oi (1999) 
branded this tendency for Chinese local government to 
support risky investments as ‘local state corporatism’. 
This tendency itself reflects strong incentives to facil-
itate the growth of local industries because of their 
contribution to local tax revenues and their impact on 
the evaluation system of cadres and high officials 
(Arrighi, 2007) on the one hand, and the priority given 
to high-tech and environmentally friendly industries 
on the other.
This support was rewarded: Yingli and Solarfun 
have become the biggest firms in Baoding City (shi) 
and Qidong County (xian), respectively. Suntech has 
become the second biggest firm in Wuxi City (shi). 
Most of the city governments in Jiangsu Province 
have strongly supported local PV firms: Suntech in 
Wuxi, Trina Solar in Changzhou, China Sunergy in 
Nanjing and Solarfun in Nantong.17
From 2005 a second important source of finance 
was exploited. In 2003 and 2004 global demand 
soared. Under the influence and guidance of 
returnees and overseas Chinese who knew the global 
financial market well, these new companies (along 
with companies in other sectors) were able to raise 
capital through IPOs on foreign stock markets. In 
2005 Suntech was listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE); in 2006, Trina Solar and Solarfun 
were listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq, respectively; 
in 2007, Yingli followed suit by joining the NYSE 
and in the same year JA Solar and China Sunergy 
were listed on Nasdaq.18 Subsequently, all of these 
companies were able to draw on overseas capital 
markets to expand their production capacities very 
rapidly, helping China to emerge as the world’s 
largest PV manufacturing nation by 2008.
In part because the Chinese financial system was 
not liberalized, China was affected by the financial 
crisis only as a result of negative impacts on export 
markets, while the Chinese government’s fiscal and 
monetary stimulus contributed to the availability of 
vast reserves of low-cost capital from Chinese state 
banks. These resources have also allowed Chinese 
companies to scale up capacity, reduce manufactur-
ing costs to levels well below their peers’ and gain 
market share. Another result is that a growing num-
ber of American, European and Japanese firms 
employ Chinese module producers in an OEM 
capacity and sell these modules under their own 
brand names.
Conclusions :  geographical 
interdependence and growth
The years up to 2010 witnessed unfettered solar 
energy industry growth in Germany and China. 
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Recent growth was, however, greatest in China and 
Taiwan, and the margins of German producers have 
been squeezed. German and, more generally, western 
manufacturers remain significant but are adding less 
capacity. Chinese (and Taiwanese) cell and module 
manufacturers, conversely, plan large capacity 
increases. These investments will increase global 
overcapacity and contribute to low overall rates of 
capacity utilization.
In 2010 and 2011 prices fell by more than one-
half, in part as a result of learning curve effects, but 
mainly because of excess capacity. Chinese costs 
are about one-half of those in Germany. Chinese 
and other Asian low-cost producers can reduce 
prices to increase demand and market share. The 
strong downward pressure on prices will therefore 
continue, and these pressures will accelerate the 
ongoing transformation of the industry: the geogra-
phy of markets and demand will continue to change, 
vertical integration will increase, as will down-
stream integration, contract manufacture, offshore 
production, acquisitions and mergers, and market 
exits.
In 2011 and 2012 the German government 
started to make significant cuts in feed-in tariffs 
reigning in demand. In spite of these cuts, new 
capacity in 2011 was expected to exceed 7.5 GWp. 
To reduce the volume of new installations in the 
face of opposition to solar energy from large 
electricity producers and claims that the tariff was 
driving up electricity costs, in 2012 the German 
government pushed forward with further reform of 
the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEGÄG) 
cutting support in January 2012 and again in April 
2012. These measures are expected to stop planned 
investments and substantially reduce the pace of 
installations with potentially negative effects on 
Chinese producers in the upstream part of the solar 
value chain.
In contrast, market growth is stronger in China 
and India – where the governments plan significant 
increases in installed capacity – and in the USA, 
especially in California. In China, government 
energy revitalization plans envisage subsidizing 300 
large-scale projects. The geography of market 
demand is therefore changing, with the fastest 
growth found not in Europe but in Asia and the USA.
German PV companies have excellent 
technological capabilities yet confront a difficult 
market and competitive situation. In 2011 Q-Cells 
reduced its workforce of 2500 by almost 1000, and 
reported a €846 million loss. A Bank Sarasin study 
considers German companies to be ill prepared for 
currently unfolding difficulties, and anticipates that 
‘only about one-half of Germany’s 50 or so larger 
solar power companies will survive in the next five 
years’. At the start of April 2012 Q Cells filed for 
bankruptcy. Two sets of factors are at work.
The first difficulty relates to several characteristics 
of the external competitive environment, and the 
second to the characteristics of German firms. As far 
as the environment is concerned, the market share of 
the top 10 companies is increasing strongly. Critical 
mass and scale in production and sales are a 
significant advantage. Moreover, 80% of the capacity 
of these firms is in Asia, where costs are one-half of 
those in Germany. As a result, more German 
companies will offshore production to low-cost 
countries. Small companies that retain production 
onshore will therefore face a threefold threat of low-
cost competition from Asian and offshored western 
companies, a more sluggish domestic market and a 
limited presence in the world’s growth markets. 
Many small German companies are ill-placed to 
confront these challenges: many are too small to 
achieve scale economies in production and do not 
have access to all market channels (of which project 
channels are particularly important). A shake out, 
mergers and co-operative ventures are therefore 
highly probable as German companies seek to adjust 
cost structures, increase scale, acquire sufficient 
capital and improve market access.
At the end of 2011 these contrasting geographies 
of production and consumption were the source of 
increasing international trade frictions in the still 
depressed economies of Europe and North America. 
In October 2011 Solar World AG’s US subsidiary, 
Solar World Industries America, fronted a petition 
filed by a group of US companies with the US 
Department of Commerce and the US International 
Trade Commission (USITC) alleging that Chinese 
companies are selling solar cells and modules at 
prices below costs of production and have received 
200 government subsidies, including cut-price raw 
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materials such as aluminium and polysilicon, tax 
exemptions, massive loans at below-market rates of 
interest and discounts on land, power and water. The 
petition was prompted by several factors. One was 
the bankruptcy of Solyndra, a solar panel maker that 
received a $0.5 billion US federal government loan, 
and two other companies. Another was soaring 
Chinese imports rising from $21.3 million in 2005 to 
$2.65 billion in 2011. These increases saw the market 
share of Chinese companies reach 47%. In December 
2011 the US USITC upheld the complaint, opening 
the way for the US Department of Commerce to 
impose proposed antidumping and countervailing 
duties. In March 2012 relatively small tariffs of 2.9–
4.73% were proposed though antidumping decisions 
remained to be made.
In December 2011 the China Photovoltaic 
Industry Alliance (CPIA) asked the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce to conduct a dumping and subsidy 
investigation into US sales of polysilicon, a vital 
component of solar cells, and into the adoption in 
the USA of measures that violate World Trade 
Organization rules and lower the competitiveness of 
Chinese products in the US market. The CPIA argued 
that overseas companies led by the USA more than 
doubled polysilicon imports to reach 47,500 tonnes 
in 2010 and plan further increases to reach 60,000 
tonnes in 2011 and significantly reduce prices to 
bankrupt their Chinese competitors. In the third 
quarter of 2011, many Chinese polysilicon factories 
stopped or reduced production, and more than 2000 
jobs were lost in one province alone. In China the 
Ministry of Commerce responded by setting up an 
investigation into six US projects not just in solar 
energy but also in the wind and hydroelectric power 
sectors.
If the US complaint is upheld, several Chinese 
companies plan to relocate some operations 
outside of China. US installers were worried about 
the impact on sales, and US equipment makers 
feared that the dispute might adversely affect sales 
in the Chinese market (Diao and Du, 2011; Du and 
Ding, 2011).
The outcome of these conflicts will have sig-
nificant impacts on future geographies of PV pro-
duction and markets and indicate the significance 
of institutional contexts and rules in shaping 
the geographies of market creation, investment 
and investment finance, and of innovation and 
competitiveness.
The interdependencies examined in this article 
are also of wider significance. The rapid growth of 
China and of a number of other rising powers 
combined with Europe and the developed world’s 
loss of momentum (Dunford and Yeung, 2011) 
signify the emergence of challenges to the economic 
and political leadership of the western world and the 
need to pay much more attention to global 
interdependencies in shaping the trajectories of 
European industries, cities and regions.
The third important set of implications of this 
article relate to theoretical questions. In this article 
we have indicated, first, the significance of 
geographies of interdependence. Second, we have 
emphasized the importance of the state and a 
hierarchical institutional order in creating contrasting 
social conditions for economic life. Third, we have 
paid considerable attention to demand-side factors 
alongside the supply-side factors on which much 
recent economic geography theory has concentrated.
The framework we developed takes the enterprise 
and its environment as the starting point, and the 
regional system as a set of enterprises. Over time its 
ways of organizing production evolves as enterprises 
seek to innovate, compete and grow (Figure 2 and 
the idea that innovation and competitiveness is one 
core driver of development). The relative success of 
enterprises and an associated set of organizational 
choices (such as mergers, acquisitions and takeovers) 
are proximate causes of changes in the structure of 
the system (Figure 2). However, these changes 
unfold in a context of interaction amongst regional 
and national economies: different economies 
specialize in activities that are sometimes 
complementary and sometimes competitive, and 
these interdependencies and the ways they are 
politically mediated are vital drivers of relative 
growth and development.
Second, the development of each enterprise 
depends on the availability of credit and other 
financial resources (Figure 3). These resources are 
used not just to invest in plant and equipment, but 
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also to purchase material inputs. In this article, 
accordingly, we paid greater attention to differences 
in the availability and cost of credit and, more 
generally, of financial drivers of development.
Third, the development of the solar sector is 
crucially dependent on the size and geographical 
extent of markets. Market creation and expansion is, 
in part, a consequence of active policy choices that 
reflect values and interests. In money economies 
accumulation and growth depend on the scale of 
effective market demand; market demand depends 
on expenditure; expenditure depends on income; and 
incomes are created through the advance of wages 
and the purchase of material inputs of all kinds. 
Advances themselves depend on the existence of 
accumulated wealth, credit and deposits. In other 
words, economies are driven not mainly by supply-
side but by a set of demand-side mechanisms, as 
recognized in Keynesian and Marxist as opposed to 
neoclassical models.
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Notes
 1. These data refer to sector 854140 in the HS 1996 
Classification, comprising photosensitive semiconductor 
devices, including PV cells whether or not assembled in 
modules or made up into panels and light-emitting 
diodes.
 2. There are three technologies in the PV industry: 
crystalline silicon (c-Si); thin film; and others (Boyle, 
1996). Of these, c-Si solar cells accounted for about 
83% of the world PV market in 2010. A major 
advantage is that complete production lines can be 
purchased, installed and started in a relatively short 
space of time. In 2005–2009, however, temporary 
shortages of silicon and the market entry of firms 
offering turn-key production lines for thin-film solar 
cells saw large increases in investment.
 3. Interview with Thomas Chrometzka, Head of 
International Affairs in the German Solar Industry 
Association (BSW), 16 May 2011.
 4. A feed-in tariff scheme relies more on non-market 
than on market mechanisms. Market-orientated 
tradeable certificates and renewable portfolio 
standards were adopted in the UK and in many states 
in the USA.
 5. Interview with Thomas Chrometzka, Head of 
International Affairs in the German Solar Industry 
Association (BSW), 16 May 2011.
 6. The initial wage of an engineer with a Master’s or 
PhD degree in PV firms is around €30,000 or €40,000 
per year, respectively (interview with Professor 
Gerhard Seifert, Solarvalley Graduate School and 
Martin-Luther University, 17 May 2011). This figure 
is much greater than that for engineers in Chinese 
enterprises.
 7. Interview with Professor Peter Woditsch, former 
Chief Executive Officer of Deutsche Solar AG, 10 
May 2011.
 8. Interview with Xiaozhong (Colin) Yang, Vice President 
of Public Affairs in Trina Solar, 21 July 2010.
 9. Interview with Jun Zhu, Domestic Market Manager 
in Solarfun, 19 July 2010.
10. Interview with Seok Jin Lee, Vice President of Sales 
and Marketing in LDK Solar, and a former Chief 
Operating Officer in Yingli, 7 July 2010.
11. Interviews with Sang Soon Bae, Senior Manager of 
Hanwha Chemical and former Chief Executive 
Officer of Nesco Solar, 20 December 2009 and 7 May 
2010.
12. Interview with Dr Matthias Peschke, Chief Operating 
Officer of Masdar PV GmbH, 19 May 2011.
13. Interview with Renbao Sun, Vice Manager in the 
Development and Coordination Department of China 
Sunergy, 20 July 2010.
14. Interview with Honghua Xu, Vice Director, Institute 
of Electrical Engineering, Chinese Academy of 
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Science, and a former independent director of JA 
Solar, 6 July 2010.
 Interview with Wang, Wenjing, Institute of Electrical 
Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2 August, 
2010.
15. Interview with Honghua Xu, and with Professor 
Qidong Wei, a professor of Nandong University and 
a director of Jiangsu PV Industry Association, 8 July 
2010.
16. Interview with Harry Chen, Group Office Director, 
Suntech, 16 July 2010.
17. Interview with Professor Qidong Wei, op. cit.
18. Interview with Honghua Xu, op.cit.
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